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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the _Case
In her Appellant's Brief, Ms. Karsten argued that the district court abused its
discretion when it failed to set aside her guilty plea and dismiss her judgment of
conviction. This brief is necessary to address the State's argument that Ms. ~<arsten's
appeal is moot. Additionally, this brief is necessary to address the State's claim that
Ms. Karsten's interpretation of !.C. § 19-2604(1) is inconsistent with Idaho precedent.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Ms. Karsten's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but
are incorporated herein by reference thereto.

1

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it failed to set aside Ms. Karsten's guilty
plea and dismiss her judgment of conviction?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Failed To Set Aside Ms. Karsten's
Guilt Plea And Dismiss Her Jud ment Of Conviction
In its Respondent's Brief, the State argues that Ms. Karsten's appeal is moot
because I.C. § 19-2604 was amended after the district court denied her request to set
aside her guilty plea and dismiss her judgment of conviction. (Respondent's Brief, pp.5,
7-9.) Since the district court told Ms. Karsten that it would entertain a second motion in
the event I.C. § 19-2604 was amended, the State argues that her appeal is moot
because there is potential relief available to her under the amended statute.
(Respondent's Brief, pp.5, 7-9.)

In support of this argument the State cites to Idaho

Schools for Equal Educational Opportunity By and Through Eikum v. Idaho State Bd. of
Educ. By and Through Mossman, 128 Idaho 276, 282 (1996), for the proposition that
"actions which challenge the validity or the manner of implementation of a statute or
regulation are often mooted because the provision has been repealed, amended or
revised." However, the State fails to acknowledge that the Eikum Opinion goes on to
hold that "actions are not mooted by an amendment or replacement if the controversy is
not removed or the amendment or replacement does not otherwise resolve the parties'
claims." Id.
Contrary to the State's assertion, the amendment of I.C. § 19-2604 did not
remove the controversy or otherwise resolve the issue on appeal. Ms. Karsten's appeal
would only be moot if the relief she is requesting was available under the current
version of I.C. § 19-2604. The relevant portion of the version of I.C. § 19-2604, which
was applicable at the time of Ms. Karsten's motion to set aside her guilty plea and
vacate her judgment of conviction follows:
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(1) If sentence has been imposed but suspended, or if sentence has been
withheld, upon application of the defendant and upon satisfactory showing
that:

the court may, if convinced b v the showing made that there is no longer
cause for continuin the eriod of robation and if it be com atible with
the public interest, terminate the sentence or set aside the plea of guilty or
conviction of the defendant, and finally dismiss the case and discharge the
defendant or may amend the judgment of conviction from a term in the
custody of the state board of correction to "confinement in a penal facility"
for the number of days served prior to suspension, and the amended
judgment may be deemed to be a misdemeanor conviction.
LC.§ 19-2604(1) (emphasis added). The current version of I.C. § 19-2604(1) provides:
(1 )(a) Application for relief under this subsection may be made by the
following persons who have pied guilty to or been found guilty of a crime:

the court, if convinced by the showing made that there is no longer cause
for continuing the period of probation should the defendant be on
probation at the time of the application 1 and that there is good cause for
granting the requested relief, may terminate the sentence or set aside the
plea of guilty or conviction of the defendant, and finally dismiss the case
and discharge the defendant or may amend the judgment of conviction
from a term in the custody of the state board of correction to "confinement
in a penal facility" for the number of days served prior to sentencing, and
the amended judgment may be deemed to be a misdemeanor conviction.
I.C. § 19-2604(1) (emphasis added). The only relevant difference between the older
version of I.C. § 19-2604 and the current version of I.C. § 19-2604, is that the phrase
"should the defendant be on probation at the time of the application," is added to the
current version. However, this amendment has not removed the controversy. In fact,
Justice Eismann has interpreted the amendment to I.C. § 19-2604 in a manner which
would preclude Ms. Karsten from obtaining the relief she is currently seeking on appeal.

State v. Guess, 154 Idaho 521,529 n.3 (2013) ("We note that this year the legislature
amended section 19-2604 to expressly provide for relief after the period of probation
4

has expired, although the relief granted is only the reduction of a felony to a
misdemeanor.").
The reiief Ms. Karsten is seeking is available under both versions of LC. § 192604. However, that relief will require an appellate court to interpret I.C. § 19-2604 in
the manner for which Ms. Karsten is advocating in her Appellant's Brief, to wit, that the
word "and" followed by a comma creates an ambiguity because the "and" could either
be conjunctive or disjunctive.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.6-13.)

As such, the State's

argument that Ms. Karsten's appeal is moot is without merit.
The State also argues that Ms. Karsten's interpretation of I.C. § 19-2604 is
contrary to Idaho precedent.

(Respondent's Brief, pp.10-11.) As mentioned above,

Ms. Karsten argued:
The underlined portion of the last paragraph of I.C. § 19-2604(1 ), sets
forth two circumstances under which relief is available because the use of
a comma before the word "and" indicates that the two clauses function
independently of each other. The first clause applies if the movant is
currently on probation. The second clause applies if the movant's
probation has expired. If the legislature intended both of the clauses to be
an indivisible unit, then it would not have separated the two clauses with a
comma. Further, reading the two clauses as an indivisible unit requires
this Court to ignore the comma. As such, the use of the comma after the
word "and" indicates that the first two clauses of the last paragraph of I.C.
§ 19-2604(1) signifies two separate circumstances under which relief is
available.
" (Appellant's Brief, p.9.)

The State does not refute the logic behind Ms. Karsten's

argument instead it just cites to Guess, supra, and points to the interpretation of
I.C. § 19-2604 addressed by the Idaho Supreme Court and subsequent Court of
Appeals' Opinions which cite Guess.

(Respondent's Brief, pp.10-11.) However, the

State does not even address Ms. Karsten's contention that I.C. § 19-2604 is ambiguous
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and that the rule of lenity requires this Court to adopt her interpretation of the statute.
(Respondent's Brief, pp.9-11.)
As a final point, Ms. Karsten's argument, that the word "and" functions as a
disjunctive, was recently addressed by the Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Brooks,
157 Idaho 890 (Ct. App. 2014 ).

In that case, Brooks was pulled over for failing to

signaling for five second prior to changing lanes on a controlled access highway. Id. at
891. The police officer thought this was a violation of I.C. § 49-808(2). Id. While talking
with Brooks, the officer smelled marijuana and noticed what appeared to be
methamphetamine. Id.
Brooks filed a suppression motion, arguing that I.C. § 49-808(2) does not require
him to signal for five second before changing a lane on a controlled access highway. Id.
Idaho Code Section 49-808(2) follows:
(2) A signal of intention to turn or move right or left when required shall be
given continuously to warn other traffic. On controlled-access highways
and before turning from a parked position, the signal shall be given
continuously for not less than five (5) seconds and, in all other instances,
for not less than the last one hundred (100) feet traveled by the vehicle
before turning.
I.C. § 49-808(2) (emphasis added). "Brooks argue(d] that the plain meaning of the word
'and' is exclusively to conjoin two ideas, leading to [the] interpretation that the italicized
portion of the statute requires signaling for at least five seconds only when a vehicle is
turning from a parked position on a controlled-access highway." Id. at 892.
The Court of Appeals rejected this argument, holding:
The "and" at issue in this statute joins together two independent
prepositional phrases-" [o]n controlled-access highways" and " before
turning from a parked position"-each of which individually modifies the
remainder of the sentence to indicate when a five-second signal is
required. If the legislature had intended Brooks's proposed interpretation,
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it couid have eliminated the "and" entirely and simply written that, "before
turning from a parked position on a controlled-access highway, the signal
shall be given continuously for not less than five (5) seconds."

Id. at 892-893.

Similarly, the applicable version of I.C. § 19-2604(1 ), has two

independent clauses conjoined by a comma and the word "and," which indicates that
each clause independently modifies the remainder of the sentence. It should also be
noted that Brooks filed a petition for review with the Idaho Supreme Court, which was
denied on February 9, 2015. As such, the Idaho Supreme Court recently referred to
address the Court of Appeals' holding in Brooks.
In sum, Ms. Karsten's appeal is not moot because the recent amendment to I.C.
§ 19-2604 did not resolve the controversy on appeal.

Additionally, Ms. Karsten's

interpretation of I.C. § 19-2604 is consistent with recent Court of Appeals' precedent,
which was not changed or amendeed by the Idaho Supreme Court.

CONCLUSION
Ms. Karsten respectfully requests that this Court remand this matter for further
proceedings with instructions that her guilty plea be set aside and her judgment of
conviction be dismissed.
DATED this 2th day of March, 2015.

~---;

/_

1

v----

SHAWN F. WILKERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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